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Abstract
Public-key cryptography is a fundamental component of modern electronic com-
munication that can be constructed with many different mathematical processes.
Presently, cryptosystems based on elliptic curves are becoming popular due to strong
cryptographic strength per small key size. At the heart of these schemes is the com-
plexity of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP).
Pollard’s Rho algorithm is a well known method for solving the ECDLP and
thereby breaking ciphers based on elliptic curves for reasonably small key sizes (up
to approximately 100 bits in length). It has the same time complexity as other
known methods but is advantageous due to smaller memory requirements. This
study considers how to speed up the Rho process by modifying a key component: the
iterating function, which is the part of the algorithm responsible for determining what
point is considered next when looking for the solution to the ECDLP. It is replaced
with an alternative that is found through an evolutionary process. This alternative
consistently and significantly decreases the number of iterations required by Pollard’s
Rho Algorithm to successfully find the sought after solution.
“ -How long do you want these messages to remain secret?[...]
+I want them to remain secret for as long as men are capable of
evil”
- Cryptonomicon
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem Description
Cryptography is a vital component of modern communication. All Internet com-
merce and countless other daily interactions are only possible due to a reliance and
trust in cryptography. In the most basic formulation cryptography is the process of
taking a message (often referred to as plaintext) and passing it through a process
called encryption that turns this message into something known as ciphertext. The
defining characteristic of this ciphertext is that it obfuscates the original message into
seemingly random values and thus masks it. This ciphertext can then be sent to an
intended recipient without worry that any interloper will intercept it and read the
original message. Once this transmission is complete a converse process called decryp-
tion takes this ciphertext and computes the original plaintext message by performing
essentially the inverse of the encryption process. The reliability of a cryptographic
system is often measured by looking at how hard it is to retrieve the original plaintext
message from the ciphertext if the interloper has knowledge of what system is being
used and a copy of the ciphertext. An accessible introduction to the dynamics of
cryptography that explains these concepts is presented in [13].
A brief sketch of the classic Caesar Cipher [34] demonstrates this encryption and
decryption process. In the Caesar Cipher the letter of the message is replaced with
the letter 3 positions farther along in the alphabet. For example A is replaced with
D, B is replaced with E, etc. Using this encryption scheme we can produce the cipher
text VHFUHWV. If the interloper gleams this cipher text they are faced with the
task of reconstituting the plaintext message. If the interloper knows the details of the
Caesar Cipher and knows that this ciphertext was created using that method then
calculating the original message is trivial. The inverse operation is applied, namely
1
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shifting the letters back three positions in the alphabet and without much work the
mystery is solved and lo and behold SECRETS is revealed as the plaintext message.
We can make things a bit more difficult for the interloper by changing the offset
we use when we replace the characters. This value, that changes the composition
of the encryption, is called the key to the system and varying it produces slightly
more resilient results. Varying the key will ultimately create difficulty and create
an involved process for the illicit decryption. With the Caesar Cipher the interloper
would have to try shifting the characters of the ciphertext by different amounts until
the calculated plaintext makes sense. However, by trying all 25 possible offsets it
would not take long to arrive at the plaintext. This idea is known as Kerckhoffs’
principle [24], which states that the strength of the system must rely on the strength
of the key and not on keeping details about the system obscure. Or in other words the
cryptosystem is only as strong as the amount of computation it takes to reconstitute
the key.
More sophisticated cryptographic systems follow these same principles but instead
rely on stronger methods of encryption and more complex keys. It is even possible
to construct a cryptographic system in such a way that both the ciphertext and a
portion of the key can be communicated to the intended recipient in an insecure
channel. This type of system, known as asynchronous public key cryptography, also
removes the need of communicating the key to the end recipient, a process that very
well may be impossible if there is no absolutely trusted way for the key to reach its
intended target.
Asynchronous public key cryptography was first seen in work by Diffie and Hell-
man [5]. This was followed shortly afterwards by the Rivest, Shamir, and Adlemen
(RSA) [30] method which is still actively used in present day internet communica-
tion. The basis of these schemes is that an asynchronous key is created that has two
components: a private key and a public key. A message is passed between two parties
in such a way that private keys never need to be communicated. It is possible to
encrypt a message using the sender’s private and public key and just the receiver’s
public key. Conversely to decrypt a message knowledge of the public keys of both
parties and the private key of the receiver is all that is needed. Further, these public
key systems are created in such a way that it is computationally difficult to derive the
private key from just knowledge of the public key. In the RSA method for example,
this computational difficulty is based on the factorization of large numbers that are
the product of primes.
However, as computation power increases larger and larger keys are required in
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order to stay ahead of computational attacks. This is due to the fact that security
relies on the computational difficulty of obtaining the private key and exhaustive
and semi-exhaustive methods can be run faster to determine the private key. The
race is to create a system that is resistant to these methods, this often accomplished
by created cryptosystems with increasingly longer key sizes. With RSA this means
finding larger prime numbers to serve as components of the key. To answer this need
elliptic curve cryptography has been proposed. With elliptic curve cryptography a
key can be lengthened to increase the security of the system at a higher ratio then
with RSA. The computational difficulty here is based on the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem (ECDLP). With a sufficiently large elliptic curve the end result is
an exponential search for the values that constitute the private key. Elliptic curves
are favoured due to the fact that they provide more entropy per bit used then the
RSA method, thus allowing for a larger degree of security with the same memory size.
The underlying mathematics of elliptic curves also allows the calculation used in the
encryption process to be performed in comparatively less computation time.
A well known method of solving the ECDLP exists for small keys sizes and it is
called the Pollard Rho Algorithm [27]. Named after its inventor, the algorithm is a
clever iteration through points on the elliptic curve, or any algebraic group in fact,
in attempts to find the solution to the intractable value of the ECDLP. It has the
best known time and space complexity of any algorithm that can be used to find the
ECDLP. Since first proposed in 1975 there has been a well developed body of research
that has attempted to find efficiencies in this process. To date these efficiencies have
mostly been realized with the application of algebraic techniques.
In stark contrast to the developed literature this study instead attempts to apply a
computational intelligence (CI) technique to the Pollard Rho Algorithm in an attempt
to improve its efficiency. In particular the application of genetic programming is
conducted against the iterating function of the Rho algorithm. Roughly speaking the
iterating function is a key component of the algorithm that determines what section
of the elliptic curve is investigated next when attempting to find the solution to the
ECDLP. Genetic programming is well suited for this task as it can directly represent
the mathematical expression at the heart of the iterating function, unlike for example
a genetic algorithm, that would require modelling to find a suitable representation to
construct the iterating function.
The application of CI techniques to cryptographic domains is sparse. Most pub-
lished research focuses on the clever application of genetic algorithms to cryptographic
systems, and also seen within these results is a heavy focus on traditional ciphers,
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such as the Caesar Cipher, without much investigation into modern day cryptosys-
tems. Additionally it is very difficult to find a description of a successful application
of a genetic programming methodology to a cryptographic study. What also makes
this current study unique is that it attempts to find a speed-up for a method that
has a proven near 100% success rate.
1.2 Organization of Thesis
This thesis is presented as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the necessary background
information that describes public key cryptography, elliptic curve mathematics, and
how the Pollard Rho Algorithm works. Chapter 3 describes the research that has been
conducted on the Rho Algorithm, and also includes an examination of computational
intelligence techniques that have been used in cryptographic studies. Next Chapter 4
describes the basis of genetic programming and describes the mechanics of this study.
After this is Chapter 5, which presents the data accumulated and the results gleaned.
Finally, Chapter 6 presents concluding remarks and possible next steps.
Chapter 2
Problem Description
A description of the key components utilized in this study are presented in this chap-
ter. In particular, the idea of public key cryptography based on elliptic curves is
developed. Next, a well known method of solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete Loga-
rithm Problem (ECDLP) problem is presented, namely the Pollard Rho algorithm.
This algorithm sees its inception as a general discrete logarithm problem algorithm
but is able to solve the elliptic curve variant without much modification.
2.1 Public Key Cryptography
Figure 2.1 is the first step in a simplified introduction to the dynamics of public key
cryptography. Here two parties Alice and Bob are attempting to communicate with
one another via an insecure channel.
In Figure 2.2 a third party, Eve, discovers this communication and interposes
herself in the insecure channel. At this point Eve can simply retain a copy of the
message being transmitted to Bob or more nefariously she can change the message as
she intercepts it. Protecting the content and the authenticity of the message being
passed between Alice and Bob is the function of cryptography.
Alice
Bob
Figure 2.1: Communication from Alice to Bob
5
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Alice
Eve
Bob
Figure 2.2: Communication from Alice to Bob, intercepted by Eve
With public key cryptography a message is encrypted and decrypted using some-
thing that is referred to as a composite key. This composite key is comprised of a
public part and a private part, which is the inverse of the public part. It is essential
that it is computationally very difficult or infeasible to determine the private key from
the public key. To encrypt a message Alice must obtain a copy of Bob’s public key.
She combines it along with her message and her private key to create ciphertext and
sends it in the insecure channel.
Once Bob receives the ciphertext he uses his own private key and Alice’s public
key to decrypt it back into the original message. A very important consequence of
this transaction thus far is that there are two particular side-effects caused during
the encryption process. First only Bob will be able to decrypt the message since it
was encoded with Bob’s public key and Alice’s private key. Secondarily Bob can rest
assured it is indeed Alice that is sending him the message because he can verify her
identity by recreating a hashed value that was created using her composite key.
Due to the construction of the cryptosystem the public keys can be communicated
between Alice and Bob without any need for secrecy. Conversely, the private key never
needs to be communicated ensuring that its secrecy can be kept. Figure 2.3 shows
the process of the public keys being communicated between the two parties in the
insecure channel and Alice encrypting her message M into ciphertext C and sending
it to Bob. Bob receives this message and then uses his own private key to decrypt the
message. Although not pictured, it is easy to envision the complementary process of
Bob sending a communication to Alice. In this case Bob simply combines his message,
his private key, and Alice’s public key before sending it off.
Figure 2.4 shows what happens if Eve intercepts the ciphertext. The message
would be unintelligible to her. If she were to alter the message before passing it along
to Bob, Bob would know immediately that it was tampered with since it would not
decrypt in a meaningful way. She can even intercept the public keys of Alice and
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Alice A Public
C = M · B Public
M = C · B Private
B Private
BobB Public
Figure 2.3: Communication from Alice to Bob, encrypted with a public key cryp-
tosystem
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Alice A Public
C = M · B Public
Eve
M = C · B Private
B Private
BobB Public
Figure 2.4: Communication from Alice to Bob, encrypted with public key cryptosys-
tem
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Bob, because they are communicated quite readily between the parties, but knowing
that would not aid her in decrypting the ciphertext.
This process is greatly superior to a what is referred to as a symmetric key scheme.
In a symmetric key scheme there is only one standalone key that must be communi-
cated secretly ahead of time from Alice to Bob. If Alice and Bob can only commu-
nicate via the insecure channel there is no way to safely pass this key without Eve
possibly getting a hold of it. If a key is reused in a symmetric key scheme and is
compromised it has the potential for ruining not just Alice and Bob’s communication
but also Alice and Carl’s communication. Public key systems are more robust and do
not suffer from these drawbacks. In fact the private part of a key never needs to be
communicated to anyone, ensuring a high level of security. The most common and
popular form of public key cryptography is the previously mentioned RSA method
mentioned in Chapter 1. Recall that with RSA the reliability of the system is built on
the complexity of factoring numbers that are the product of large prime numbers. In
this thesis another popular method is examined, which is one that is based on elliptic
curves.
2.2 Elliptic Curves
An elliptic curve E is defined as the set of solutions (x, y), where a, b ∈ Z, to Equation
2.1.
y2 = x3 + ax+ b (2.1)
When plotted on a Cartesian plane the curve resembles the example curve in
Figure 2.5.
The curve is symmetric about the x-axis. Due to this symmetry many properties
arise. For instance any line connecting two distinct points P and Q on the curve will
have at most one other intersection point. In all cases the first step is to draw a line
between the two points. In total there are four different scenarios:
P and Q are both at the origin: A tangent is drawn to the origin and is said
to extend to infinity, illustrated in Figure 2.6.
P and Q share the same x-coordinate: A line is drawn between the two
points and it is said to extend to infinity, illustrated in Figure 2.7.
Line connecting P and Q does not intersect the curve at a third point:
In this case as well the line is said to extend to infinity, illustrated in Figure 2.8.
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−2 0 2 4
−5
0
5
Figure 2.5: Example elliptic curve y2 = x3 − 4x+ 4
−2 0 2 4
−5
0
5
P
•
Figure 2.6: P and Q are both at the origin
−2 0 2 4
−5
0
5
P
Q
•
•
Figure 2.7: P and Q share the same x-coordinate
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−2 0 2 4
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0
5
P
Q
• •
Figure 2.8: Line connecting P and Q does not intersect the curve at a third point
−2 0 2 4
−5
0
5
P
Q
−R
R
•
• •
•
Figure 2.9: Line connecting P and Q intersects the curve
Line connecting P and Q intersects the curve: Here the addition is calcu-
lated using the chord and tangent method. If P,Q are points on E and P 6= Q (i.e.
not any of the previously defined scenarios) then one simply draws a line between P
and Q and it will intersect the curve at a fourth point −R, which is reflected on the
x-axis to produce R. This is demonstrated in Figure 2.9.
It is possible to define this addition operation explicitly. If P = (x1, y1) and
Q = (x2, y2) are points on E neither of which is O (the point at infinity, described
shortly) then P +Q = (x3, y3) where:
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2, and
y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1
If P = Q then
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λ =
3x21 + a
2y1
(2.2)
If P 6= Q then
λ =
y2 − y1
x2 − x1 (2.3)
It is possible to define a multiplication operation over points as well. In fact
this operation can be seen as multiple applications of point arithmetic defined above,
for example 2P = P + P . This operation is often referred to as point doubling
when the scalar value is 2, while in all other cases this operation is referred to as
point multiplication. Another operation, point negation, is easy to calculate. If P =
(P.x, P.y) then −P is defined as (P.x,−P.y), or simply stated, the point is reflected
about the x-axis.
It is possible to restrict an elliptic curve E to a field. In this case we are only
interested in solutions to Equation 2.1 with Z values. When using elliptic curves
for cryptographic reasons it is beneficial to define this field Fn over n, where n is a
large prime number. We introduce an identity element O called the point at infinity.
This element satisfies P + O = P for every P . What this means is that adding
any two points on the curve will always result in a point on the curve (as seen with
point addition above) or the point at infinity. With this identity element and the
previously defined operations of point addition and point negation we are left with a
finite Abelian group.
2.2.1 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)
The preceding description can be formulated succinctly using algebraic theory as
follows. Let E be an Elliptic Curve defined over a field represented by Fn, where n
is a large prime. Let P ∈ E be a point of prime order q. Here prime order refers
to the number of applications of the field addition operator that when applied to
P eventually iterates through a series of intermediate values and then returns to P
once again. This is true because there is a finite number of elements in the field and
eventually any iteration will become cyclic. We also choose q to be a prime number
so that this iteration sequence is unique. Next let 〈P 〉 be the prime order subgroup
of E generated by P . If Q ∈ 〈P 〉 then Q = kP for some scalar k where 0 ≤ k ≤ q.
The problem is then finding k given P , Q, and the parameters of curve E.
Finding this value, known as the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
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(ECDLP), can be thought of as the elliptic curve variant to the more common log-
arithm problem. For example with y = nx, it is easy to calculate y given n and x.
However, when given y and n it is difficult to calculate x. Most logarithm operations
result in solutions that are R values. However, when calculating the logarithm over a
finite Abelian group, as in the case of the ECDLP, the solution is always a member
of the field, or in other words it is composed of an x and a y coordinate that are both
integers. Calculating a logarithm in a field or group is often referred to as the dis-
crete logarithm problem (DLP). The most familiar example of the DLP can be seen
in the integers mod p, where p is a prime number. Numerically, an example could be
33 mod 31 = y, and y can be easily calculated as 2. However, when we set out to
calculate x mod 31 = 2 we need to perform a more difficult calculation to determine
the value of x. When using Z there are infinitely many solutions, but when we restrict
the calculation to a field, and in particular a large one, it is computationally difficult
to arrive at this value with anything short of an exhaustive approach.
2.2.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
The use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography was first proposed independently by Koblitz
[15] and Miller [23]. These works presented a way of constructing a public key cryp-
tosystem using elliptic curves. Not just any curve E could be used however. It was
important to have it defined over a very large field, so that it would be resistant to
brute force attacks. Secondly the values of a and b in Equation 2.1 must be chosen
so that 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0. If this requirement is not met then the resulting curve will be
unsuitable for cryptographic use [9].
We represent two points P and Q on a suitable elliptic curve E with the follow-
ing notation: P = (P.x, P.y) and Q = (Q.x,Q.y), where each point has x and y
coordinates. Let k represent some scalar that respects the conditions described in
the previous section, that is to say, it lies within the prime subgroup generated by
P . Then our public key cryptosystem is based on the following equality: Q = kP ,
where Q can be used to represent the public key of the system and P is the private
key. It is known to be computationally difficult to determine the value of k if only
kP is provided. This computation of the ECDLP provides the complexity that the
cryptosystem is built upon. For example we can use a suitable method to encode
our message M with Q and P . This is then transmitted to the other party and by
performing the inverse of the encoding with the value of k it will then be possible to
retrieve the original message. For a general history and development of elliptic curve
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cryptographic systems [8] provides a worthy summary.
2.3 Pollard’s Rho Algorithm
2.3.1 Pollard’s Original Rho Algorithm
Pollard’s Rho Algorithm is a well understood process that is highly flexible due to
the fact that it can be applied to any discrete logarithm problem. It derives its name
from the ‘shape’ of the sequence of field elements that it examines. Figure 2.10 is a
graphical representation of this. Since the underlying field is finite, iterating through
all of the points in attempting to find the collision between the two selected field
items will eventually lead to a collision and then cycle forever. The ‘tail’ of the shape
represents the iterating points leading up to the collision where the ‘circular’ shape
represents the cycle of field items that will become periodic. There is a smallest index
t for which Xt = Xt+s for some s ≥ 1 and then Xi = Xi−s for all i ≥ t+ s.
Figure 2.10: Pollard Rho collision visualized
The original method, proposed by Pollard [27], was used to find the prime roots of
a composite number, and was constructed in such a way that it could be coded into
a programmable calculator. Soon after a slightly revised method was proposed by
Pollard [28] that was meant to compute the index of any integer to a given primitive
root of a prime p. The construction of the algorithm was general enough that it could
be modified to solve any discrete logarithm problem. A strong additional benefit of
the Rho algorithm is that it has the best run-time of any known method for solving the
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discrete logarithm problem. Similarly the memory requirements are also negligible,
making it very appealing to use.
2.3.2 Pollard’s Rho Algorithm for Elliptic Curves
With the Rho process we seek to find the value of k by determining two equations
involving points in the field that equal one another when multiplied by different scalar
values. Algorithm 1, adapted from [9], articulates this process. We are attempting
to find the solution to:
c
′
P + d
′
Q = c
′′
P + d
′′
Q (2.4)
More precisely, we attempt to find the scalar values of c′, c′′, d′, and d′′. Once
these values are known we can find the value of k by using a field inversion operation
and evaluating the following, where n is a large prime:
k = (c
′ − c′′)(d′′ − d′)−1 mod n (2.5)
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Algorithm 1 Pollard’s Rho Algorithm for Elliptic Curves [9]
Input: P ∈ E(Fq) of prime order n, Q ∈ 〈P 〉
Input: Partition function EvoH : 〈P 〉 → {1, 2, ..., L}
1: for j from 1 to L do
2: Select aj, bj ∈R [0, n− 1]
3: Compute Rj = ajP + bjQ
4: end for
5: Select c′, d′ ∈R [0, n− 1]
6: Compute X ′ = c′P + d′Q
7: X ′′ ← X ′, c′′ ← c′, d′′ ← d′
8: repeat
9: j = EvoH(X ′)
10: X ′ ← X ′ +Rj
11: c′ ← c′ + aj mod n
12: d′ ← d′ + bj mod n
13: for i from 1 to 2 do
14: j = EvoH(X ′′)
15: X ′′ ← X ′′ +Rj
16: c′′ ← c′′ + aj mod n
17: d′′ ← d′′ + bj mod n
18: end for
19: until X ′ = X ′′
20: if d′ = d′′ then
21: return False
22: else
23: k = (c′ − c′′)(d′′ − d′)−1 mod n
24: return k
25: end if
The inputs supplied to the algorithm are two points P , Q. The point Q is ex-
pressed as kP , some scalar multiple of point P . The value of k is the solution to the
ECDLP and thus finding this value would compromise the cryptosystem.
We require a hash function that will allow us to map any random point to a value
between 0 and L− 1, where L is the number of sections into which the curve will be
divided while we are searching for the value of k. Pollard’s original formulation of the
Rho algorithm used 3 sections. In most constructions of the Rho algorithm the hash
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function is simply implemented with (P.x) mod L. The purpose of the current study
is to instead use genetic programming to determine a more effective hash function
EvoH. This study fixed the value of L, i.e. the number of sections, at 32. This value
was selected as it is a common choice for implementations of the Rho Algorithm [9].
The algorithm begins by filling a random buffer R of L values in the range 1 to
L. These values are pairwise multiplied with L random points in the curve. Next
the value of c′ is set to n/4 using integer division and similarly d′ is set to 3n/4 by
integer division. X ′ is calculated. For the first iteration c
′′
is set to the same value
as c
′
and d
′′
is set to the same value as d
′
. The Rho algorithm then proceeds by
calculating two different sequences of points; this process is more commonly known
as Floyd’s cycle detecting algorithm [22]. When these two sequences yield the same
point (line 19), the process then attempts to find the value of k (line 23). What is
worth noting is that the EvoH hash function guides the choice of what intermediate
point is considered next.
The current study examines whether making the hash function distribute values
more randomly will reduce the runtime of the Rho Algorithm, i.e. whether it will
find the value of k in fewer iterations. Specifically, an evolved genetic program will
be used to replace the original hash function.
The parameters selected by the algorithm are aj, bj, c
′, and d′. The first two of
these parameters are randomly selected series of values in the range of 0 to n− 1, as
found in line 2 of Algorithm 1, while as previously described c′ and d
′
are assigned
using the previously described methodology of fixing c′ one quarter into the interval,
and d′ three quarters into the range of 0 to n− 1. Because of how these parameters
are assigned, when looking at the same values of P and Q, subsequent runs of the
algorithm differ only if the values of aj and bj are varied. Those two series are the
only independent variables in the Rho algorithm.
2.3.3 Numeric Pollard’s Rho Example
To demonstrate the ECDLP variant of the Rho algorithm consider the following
elliptic curve:
y2 = x3 + 48x+ 70 (2.6)
defined over the field F653 with field size n = 683 and setting P = (191, 422) and
Q = (422, 235). The goal then is to find the value of k in Q = kP . As previously
described L = 32, c
′
= 170 and d
′
= 512. We pass these values to Algorithm 1 which
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will eventually get to line 6 and will start computing the two cycles. The iterations
and intermediate values calculated by the Rho algorithm are presented in Table 2.1.
Iteration c
′
d
′
X
′
c
′′
d
′′
X
′′
- 170 512 x=203, y=290 170 512 x=203 ,y=290
1 218 213 x=55, y=395 377 531 x=71, y=247
2 377 531 x=71, y=247 678 211 x=230, y=251
3 164 473 x=360, y=156 429 87 x=393 ,y=485
4 678 211 x=230, y=251 377 331 x=55 ,y=395
5 173 255 x=180 ,y=421 323 591 x=360, y=156
6 429 87 x=393, y=485 332 373 x=180, y=421
7 329 630 x=203, y=290 488 65 x=203, y=290
Table 2.1: Iterations performed for numeric Pollard Rho Example
At iteration 7 we see that the two cycles have found the same value in that we
have X
′
= X
′′
. This gives us the following equality:
329P + 630Q = 488P + 65Q (2.7)
We then find the value k as in line 23:
k = (329− 488) · (630− 65)−1 mod 653 = 317 (2.8)
This presented problem is a trivial construction only meant to demonstrate the
dynamics of the Rho algorithm. No actual cryptographic cipher would be based on
such a small elliptic curve.
Chapter 3
Literature Review
Since the introduction of Pollard’s Rho algorithm in the 1970s there has been a sub-
stantive body of research looking into the method. The main goal of these endeavours
has been to find efficiencies in the process through a better application of the mathe-
matics of the discrete logarithm problems to which they have been applied. The first
half of this chapter presents progress to date.
Conversely the literature that looks at the intersection of computational intelli-
gence (CI) and cryptographic study is less robust. There is a clear lack of break-
throughs discovered. Presented here in the second half of this chapter is a look at
progress made in this area.
3.1 Research on Pollard’s Rho Algorithm
3.1.1 General Improvements to the Rho Algorithm
The single refinement that resulted in the best reduction of expected runtime of the
algorithm has been the introduction of the parallel Pollard Rho [37]. This process is
divided into two parts: a server component and a client component. The pseudocode
of the client process is presented in Algorithm 2. Each client process first begins with
a random seed and, similar to the serial formulation of the Rho, attempts to find the
scalar multipliers of two different sets of values but instead of attempting to find k
in Q = kP it is trying to uncover what are known as distinguished points. In the
case of the ECDLP formulation of the problem a distinguished point is a coordinate
with an easy-to-test-for property that only occurs in a small percentage of the points
considered [37]. A common distinguished point test is determining if the first t bits
of the binary representation of the x-coordinate of the point are all zero [12]. This
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can be done with a single or operation and thus is easy to test for. The next random
point in the parallel client process is found similarly to the serial Rho, an iterating
function of some design is applied to the randomly generated point.
Algorithm 2 Parallel Pollard Rho Client Process
Generate random point R0 = [a0]P + [b0]Q with random seed s
Compute next value with iterating function Ri+1 = f(Ri)
When a distinguished point Rd is found send s and Rd to Server.
Continue
Once a client process identifies a distinguished point it sends this value along with
the initial random seed to the server process, outlined in Algorithm 3. In our case
the client is sending a stream of Rd and s values.
The server process listens for these incoming tuples from all of the clients and
when it receives two Rd values that are identical and have different initial values it
attempts to determine the value of k. In our case again the server is attempting to
calculate the scalar values of: ad, bd, cd, and dd. Once these values are found a field
inversion operation is performed to find the final value for k, the multiplier in front
of point P . The parallel formulation of the Rho Algorithm has a speed up factor of
M, where M is the number of processors running the client process.
Algorithm 3 Parallel Pollard Rho Server Process
Look for collisions amongst the incoming s and Rd.
Use s to obtain:
Rd = [ad]P + [bd]Q and Rd = [cd]P + [dd]Q
Compute solution: Q = cd−ad
dd−bdP
Studies have been performed that look at components of the generalized Pollard
Rho algorithm in attempts at finding efficiencies in their construction. The iterat-
ing function used in the Rho algorithm has been evaluated in [35] and [36]. These
studies looked at constructing a much more complicated iterating function than the
3 partition method first postulated by Pollard. Two categories of iteration function
replacements, or walks, were introduced: r additive walks and r + q mixed walks.
In short the r component of the walk represents the application of an adding group
operation, whereas the q component represents the application of a doubling group
operation. Through empirical testing it was determined that an r additive walk of
16 yielded a speed up of at least 1.25 when compared to the original Pollard formu-
lation. In the case of the r + q walks parameter choices of r ≥ 16 and q/r ≈ 1/4
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yielded a closer to random performance and therefore better demonstrated runtime
over Pollard’s original iterating function.
Alongside the dynamics of the actual Pollard Rho algorithm a study has been
published that looks at the effects of computing the Rho on the same group subse-
quent times. In [17] results were presented that showed that if attempting to solve
L instances of the Rho in the same group it is possible to do better then L subse-
quent independent runs of the Rho Algorithm if re-use of all previously calculated
distinguished points is possible. This process allows all L instances to be solved con-
secutively but since all distinguished points are retained the storage requirements are
much higher than is needed for each run.
3.1.2 Improvements to the Pollard Rho Algorithm applied
to the ECDLP
While a field of research has been developed that looks at the general dynamics of
the Rho algorithm there is a further body of literature that looks specifically at the
application of the Pollard Rho in the context of solving the ECDLP. This is most
likely due to the fact that elliptic curves are set to be at the forefront of industrial ap-
plications and therefore provide the most interesting landscape of applicable problem
spaces.
A prolific research team, Wang & Zhang, has produced a series of work looking at
this idea of making the Pollard Rho work faster for the ECDLP. In [43] a new iterating
function is proposed that uses point halving as the mechanism to decrease runtime.
Point halving is constructed as the inverse operation of point doubling: instead of
calculating 2P = P + P the intent is to find P half way through an interval if it is
known that Q = 2P . It was shown that there is some computational savings of using
this in place of the usual iterating function. In fact in a certain set of standardized
curves used in industry a saving in calculation of about 15% is achieved.
In the next work published [40] an efficiency is found that exploits the idea that
a p-th power of an element in the ECDLP is a cyclic shift of the normal basis rep-
resentation where p is the characteristic of the underlying field. What this means is
that it was possible to achieve a speed up factor of
√
m for the field Fpm when using
this cyclic shift in place of the usual iterating function.
An efficiency based on treating elliptic curve points as equivalence classes is pre-
sented in [38]. Here a negation map is created that puts curve points in the equivalence
classes {±P}. While this method creates a reduction in runtime of the Rho by almost
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a factor of
√
2 it is possible that the algorithm will get caught in certain loops when
iterating through points. The study presents methods of detecting these cycles and
constructing methods for escaping from them.
The frequently used Floyd’s cycle detecting algorithm is investigated in [39]. Here
a new method which retains a cache of points seen is implemented. After N points
have been calculated by the iterating function the lowest value seen is retained in the
cache. Then after every subsequent N iterations the lowest value is again retained and
compared against this cache. When the same value is seen it is possible to determine
the collision. The article speculates that a careful choice of N will enable this method
to perform well. Through empirical testing it was shown that it is possible to decrease
the run time by approximately 1%.
The last work produced by this research team is seen in [41]. Here the iterating
function is the focus of the study. In this case an efficiency is created by recognizing
that in point arithmetic obtaining P −Q requires minimal calculations when P +Q
is known. If both of these sets of values are retained when a distinguished point is
encountered this generally speaking allows for a reduction of the space searched by
a factor of 4, with a penalty of an additional 2 field multiplication operations and 1
field squaring operation at each iterating step.
Finally worthy of note, it has been shown that certain poor choices for the under-
lying ECDLP problem can result in a Rho Algorithm that trivially runs faster. In
[42] it was demonstrated that by taking automorphisms of curves over GF (2m) with
coefficients in GF (2) the Rho can be sped up by a factor of
√
2m by making clever
use of automorphisms of the curve. These curves, referred to as anomalous binary
curves, therefore need to be explicitly avoided when attempting to create an elliptic
curve cryptosystem.
3.2 Cryptographic Investigations using CI tech-
niques
Many survey articles have been published that summarize the current literature. In
particular [29] and [19] are comprehensive histories of cryptographic and cryptanalysis
studies involving computational intelligence (CI) techniques worth consulting. Useful
to note is that works often focus on the application of genetic algorithms (GA) as
opposed to other computational intelligence techniques. A discussion of CI techniques
and methodologies is presented shortly in Chapter 4 and the core components of these
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systems are elaborated there.
3.2.1 Classic Ciphers with CI
A focus seen in the literature is a concentration on using computational intelligence
techniques in attempts to break classical ciphers. These traditional ciphers are essen-
tially text randomization processes such as transposition, substitution, and columnar
substitution, among others. A specific example is the Caesar Cipher first presented
in Chapter 1.
Most of these traditional methods are only useful as teaching tools of crypto-
graphic principles and are not often seen in industry or in current research because
they are easily broken using known brute-force methods. However, the first few treat-
ments of using a genetic algorithm for ciphers appear in [32] and [21]. In these works
substitution ciphers are attacked with clever application of genetic algorithms. No-
table in these studies is the relatively poor performance of the GA, which acts as a
disincentive for further analysis of the problem.
Traditional ciphers are also the subject of [4]. In this work actual implementations
of 12 different methods presented in previous literature are empirically tested. It was
found that only 3 of these produced any successful result and only when used against
trivial key lengths.
3.2.2 Stream and Block Ciphers with CI
In addition to endeavours looking at classical text based ciphers there have been
some forays into analysis of stream and block based cryptosystems. These types of
ciphers are more contemporary and often operate on data once it is in its binary
representation. These ciphers perform a prescribed encryption operation on either
a continuously filling buffer, as in the case of the stream cipher, or by breaking the
data up into smaller word or byte sized sections, as with block ciphers.
In [2] a genetic algorithm was used to determine and attack weak keys in a block
based substitution permutation network. Here a weak key means one that allows
for an easy solution to the cryptosystem. Results showed that the GA was able to
determine a subset of those weak keys using small input text.
Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) is the subject of a different study found in [20].
Here a combination of GA and a harmony search is presented. The presented system
attempts to determine the key used over a one round application of TEA using known
plaintext and corresponding ciphertext. Results showed the combined evolutionary
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scheme was able to determine degenerate keys without much work, but more difficult
key choices were not possible to decipher.
The RC4 stream cipher is examined in [6]. Here, as seen in most other studies, a
GA is used to find the permutation stored in the state register which lies as the heart
of the cipher. The study showed that by creating a GA with a slow adaptive mutation
process it was possible to find a solution for every permutation choice. The study
also provided an approximate upper bound for runtime of the algorithm required to
be reasonably sure that a solution will be found. This presented value was 2121.5
generations of evolution.
3.2.3 Cryptology with CI
Perhaps most common when looking at cryptographic studies is the idea of subverting
a cipher by finding a vulnerability in its construction or devising the secret key through
an unintended method, but there is a vein of research that looks at just the opposite.
In this case research is performed that attempts to strengthen cryptographic protocols
or to devise new systems altogether. There is a presence in the literature devoted to
the application of CI techniques to solve these problems.
A method of devising good parameter sets for elliptic curve systems is presented
in [33]. Here a GA is presented with the aim of finding the best choice for the
values a and b in the basic equation of an elliptic curve y2 = x3 + ax + b (first
articulated in Equation 2.1 in Chapter 2). This GA is put to work after the prime
for the underlying field is chosen. The reported results indicate that the GA was
mostly successful but in some circumstances returns elliptic curves with parameter
sets unsuitable for cryptographic use.
An attempt to encrypt a stream of data using a GA inspired mechanism is pre-
sented in [18]. Here an encryption scheme is presented that uses a random data
generation sequence that is then manipulated through a crossover operator. The
result is a seemingly random sequence of data that is obfuscated. The decryption
process then is the opposite operation, the same random sequence is started and fed
into the inverse crossover operation thereby regenerating the original stream data. A
similar study presented in [11] attempts to create a public key cryptographic system
around a pseudorandom number generator that has been manipulated by a genetic
algorithm. In [10] another cryptosystem constructed with computational intelligence
methodologies is presented. In this study a genetic algorithm was used to manipulate
parameters that were given to an artificial neural network that created a pseudo-
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random number generator. The application of the genetic algorithm created a more
robust system as it removed anomalies that could otherwise be detected by watching
the output of the pseudorandom number generator.
Finally, a survey paper [25] presents the landscape in current research in the
application of evolutionary processes to cryptographic domains. What is curiously
absent in this work, and the other work investigated in this literature review, is the
application of a genetic programming scheme to a cryptographic domain.
3.2.4 Elliptic Curves Cryptosystems with CI
While previously mentioned as a survey article, original research is also presented
in [19]. Many different studies are presented in this work but the most pertinent
to the current investigation is an experiment that considers the use of an artificial
neural network to find the least significant bit of an ECDLP solution. Finding this
value leads to a reduction in the computation time required to calculate the rest of
the solution. Field sizes of 14, 20, and 32 bits were investigated. This evolutionary
inspired technique managed to identify the correct solution after training at an average
rate of 57%. A control based on random search was used in the study as comparison
and it found the correct solution at an average rate of 65%.
3.3 The intersection of Pollard Rho and CI tech-
niques
The method used in the current study is to employ genetic programming to reduce
the number of iterations required of the Pollard Rho Algorithm that effectively has
a success rate of 100%. This is ensured due to the construction of the ECDLP as
stipulated in Chapter 2 and as described in [9]. To the best of the author’s knowledge
there has been no similar attempted study.
Chapter 4
Representation and Experiment
Design
With the adequate background information presented it is now possible to construct
the main experiment at the heart of this study.
4.1 Genetic Programming
Genetic Programming is a metaheuristic popularized by Koza [16] which mimics nat-
ural evolution. The goal of this study is to evolve a highly fit expression tree to rep-
resent the iterating hash function by first creating an initial population of randomly
generated expression trees based on simple components referred to as terminal nodes
and internal nodes and then evolving this population through successive generations
with the goal of finding the most fit final expression tree. Fitness is determined via the
application of a fitness function that will assign a numerical score to each expression
tree considered. With each generation this new population is created by probabilis-
tically applying reproduction and mutation and performing a selection process that
picks the most fit individuals to survive to the next generation.
In this scheme reproduction is performed by a single point cross over technique.
Two expression trees selected via probabilistic methods randomly pick a node. The
two trees are split at this node and swap the resulting sub trees. Mutation is per-
formed by probabilistically selecting an expression tree and probabilistically regen-
erating a simple sub-tree at a random node. Selection is performed by tournament
selection. This study was conducted using an evolutionary algorithm software mod-
elling package called Distributed Evolutionary Algorithms in Python (DEAP) [7].
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4.1.1 Expression Tree Nodes
The goal of this study is to evolve a highly fit genetic program expression tree to
represent the iterating hash function for the Pollard Rho Algorithm first introduced
in Chapter 2. These expression trees are comprised of two components: terminal
nodes and internal nodes. Expression trees can be constructed as binary trees or
may be written out as nested prefix expressions. When these trees are parsed they
become mathematical expressions that, in this study, will be used in place of the
standard hash function.
Terminal Nodes
Uncommonly, when compared to other genetic programming studies, the complete set
of terminals utilized was simply one operator: P.y. This represents the Y coordinate
of the point currently being considered by the hash function.
During the course of this study many different formulations of terminal nodes
were considered that provided less successful results. It was determined that using
just the y-coordinate produced better reductions in runtime, as opposed to schemes
that used the x -coordinate on its own or in combination with the y-coordinate. It
stands to reason that this might be the case because the y-coordinate moves along
the curve more quickly and covers a greater range as opposed to the x -coordinate,
which is symmetric about the x -axis and could possibly confuse the iterating function
due to this duplication of values. In a similar vein the introduction of trigonometric
functions and random number generators into the GP expression did not decrease
runtimes of the Rho algorithm. Empirical testing also determined that the inclusion
of a protected modulus operator did not aid in decreasing Rho iterations.
Internal Nodes
The set of internal nodes used by this study are commonly used, and are articulated
in the following list:
• operator.sum Integer sum of two operands
• operator.sub Integer difference of two operands
• operator.mul Integer product of two operands
• operator.neg Negation of a single operand
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Empirical testing showed that this set of operators was expressive enough to create
and evolve a diverse population of expression trees. The syntax of these internal
nodes are a direct result of the Python programming language used for modelling in
the DEAP software. Figure 4.1 shows an example expression tree formed during the
course of a run.
operator.sub(operator.neg(P.y),
operator.mul(operator.mul(P.y, P.y),
operator.add(P.y, P.y)))
Figure 4.1: Example of Evolved Expression Tree
4.1.2 Algorithm
The genetic programming algorithm utilized in this study is based on Chapter 7 of
[1] and is presented in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Evolutionary Algorithm
Input: NumGen, PopSize, pc, pm
Output: a, the best individual found during evolution
1: t← 0
2: P (t)← initialize(PopSize)
3: F (t)← evaluate(P (t), PopSize)
4: while t ≤ NumGen do
5: P
′
(t)← crossover(P (t), pc)
6: P
′′
(t)← mutate(P ′(t), pm)
7: F (t)← evaluate(P ′′(t), PopSize)
8: P (t+ 1)← select(P ′′(t), F (t), PopSize)
9: t← t+ 1
10: end while
11: a← individual from P (t) with best Fitness
12: return a
There are four inputs to the algorithm. NumGen represents the number of gener-
ations for which the evolution will be performed. PopSize represents the population
size, or the number of individual candidate expression trees seen in each generation.
Finally there is pc which is the probability of crossover, and pm is the probability of
mutation.
To begin a time counter t is initialized. Next the population is initialized and
assigned to P (t). In the initialization, a collection of randomly generated expression
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trees are created using the terminal and internal nodes. This initial population is
devised with a method known as half and half up to 2 levels deep [26]. Here half and
half represents an even distribution of trees generated using the grow and full methods
of random tree generation. With the grow method trees are randomly created by
selecting both internal and terminal nodes until maximum depth is reached, after
which only terminal nodes are selected. With the full method trees are generated
in such a way that internal nodes are selected randomly until maximum depth is
achieved, at that point only terminal nodes are further selected. This initialization
method is a very common approach as it provides a well distributed set of candidate
expression trees.
Additionally a maximum tree size of 17 is enforced during the evolutionary process.
This value, popularized by Koza [16], is a common choice for this parameter. This
is implemented as a method to control bloat. Bloat is characterized as unwieldy
growth of the expression tree to a point that doesn’t improve the performance of the
expression. Without a hard limit on tree size the evolution could produce rather large
expressions that simply grow in size but do not improve fitness.
Next fitness is evaluated (line 3) across all members of the population. The method
of determining fitness is explained extensively in the following section. Line 4 is the
start of the main loop of the algorithm. In line 5 the population P
′
(t) is created by
applying the crossover operator probabilistically against the threshold of pc. With
crossover two expression trees each randomly select a node and exchange the two
subtrees that are rooted at that random node. In line 6 a probabilistically chosen
number of individuals in the population, this time with the threshold of pm, are
mutated. Mutation, again a random process, selects some node of the individual
being considered and swaps it with a new randomly generated sub-tree; post mutation
this population becomes P
′′
(t). In line 7 the entire newly created population has its
fitness re-evaluated.
In line 8 the population for the next generation is created using a selection method.
In this study the selection method is known as tournament selection. Here a prede-
fined number of individuals are compared to one another and the one with the best
fitness is retained. At the end of the loop the generation counter is incremented and
if still less than the NumGen the process repeats itself. Finally after the evolution is
exhausted we pick the best fit individual a from the final population.
The values of the parameters just described are enumerated in Table 4.1. This
constructed set of runtime parameters was determined through extensive empirical
testing. Most values selected for runtime parameters are standard fare. For example a
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Parameter Value
Population Size 1000
Generations 100
Max Depth of Program Trees 17
Probability of Crossover 0.9
Probability of Mutation 0.1
Tournament Selection Size 5
Table 4.1: Runtime Parameters
crossover probability of 90% and mutation probability of 10% are usually the baseline
choices in the standard construction of a genetic programming study. Other variations
of these two values were experimented with, however, there was no clear consistent
improvement discovered in doing so. Perhaps what is worth noting is the higher
then usual choice of a tournament selection size of 5. The baseline value is often 3,
however, when that was implemented in this study it was found that the evolution did
not progress with a consistent generation over generation improvement. The necessity
of choosing 5 as the selection size might be a consequence of having a fitness function
that is not active enough for the genetic program. Fitness is treated exhaustively
in the following section. Another parameter worth noting is number of generations.
The selected value of 100 is again high when compared to the baseline choice. This
might also be a consequence of compensating for a relatively flat fitness function.
4.2 Fitness Function
The fitness function is an integral part of the genetic programming process. The
rationale for the choice of function here is to randomize the values produced by the
EvoH hash function. The supposition is that if it is adequately random the next
points considered by the Rho process will be well distributed through the curve and
result in a lower number of iterations to find the value of k. Since each curve is unique,
as well as the choices of P and Q, the iterating function used for each Rho process
should be created in a way that maximizes randomness for the choices of parameters.
Randomness in the distribution of hash values was assessed by passing a collection
of test points of the elliptic curve in consideration through the evolved hash function
and analyzing the sequence of resultant values. Each individual was therefore eval-
uated on a sequence of values in the range 1 to L that was the same length as the
number of test points used. The number of test points used to evaluate fitness varies
and was assigned based on the number of digits in the the field size of the curve.
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Number of Digits in Field Size Number of Test Points
5 32
6 64
7 128
8 256
Table 4.2: Test Point Sizes
The quantities of test points chosen were determined through empirical testing and
are summarized in Table 4.2. Admittedly selecting intervals based on the number
of digits in the field creates a rather wide distribution. Some fine tuning and closer
examination might reveal a method of determining the perfect number of test points
to use. In this study a sweep from low to high was conducted, and as soon as a
quantity of test points started to perform well it was selected as the representative of
the interval.
Many different fitness functions were attempted during the construction of this
study, not all however, were successful. A preliminary examination looked at unique
values produced by the test point sequence. Here the fitness function tried to ensure
that each value from 1 to L was represented with an equal number of sequence mem-
bers. This fitness formulation did not result in lower iteration numbers. Similarly
the most common methods of calculating averages were combined as a fitness mea-
sure. This included taking the mean, median and mode of the test point sequence.
These average seeking fitness functions also failed to reduce the number of Rho it-
erations. Another class of fitness function considered was entropy based. Entropy
here measures the average amount of information contained in the sequence versus
the amount of values it produces and is based on Shannon’s work [31]. As with pre-
viously described classes of fitness functions these failed to produce a reduction in
Rho iterations. Lastly, attempts to create a many-objective fitness function based
on combining multiple average calculation methods failed to produce positive results.
No assignment of weights could be devised that provided a consistent meaningful
reduction in iterations taken.
It stands to reason that a more thorough calculation of fitness might have been
attempted. It could be easy to envision a formulation where the Rho algorithm itself
is run to completion or for a certain number of iterations with each candidate as
a method of assessing fitness. The immediate drawback of such a scheme is that
computation time would be prohibitive. As will be presented in Chapter 5, a single
run of the Rho algorithm with an evolved iteration function easily takes a few days
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to complete. Additionally running it for a certain number of iterations is also non-
instructive. There are no intermediate indicators that an iterating function is doing
better then a different one: only the total number of iterations performed by the Rho
can be quantified, and that value can only be captured upon completion.
The fitness function used in this study was inspired by Knuth’s work on perfect
distribution of hash values produced by hash functions that approximate the golden
ratio [14]. Equations 4.1 and 4.2 show the two calculations comprising the fitness
function.
TPS =
t∑
n=1
EvoH(TestPoint[n])(mod (L+ 1)) ∗ φ (4.1)
fitness =
TPS
t
+ penalty (4.2)
Here we seek to minimize the fitness value. A sequence of test-points, t in length,
from the curve under consideration are randomly selected and added to an array called
R, which is calculated in line 3 of Algorithm 1. Each test point has the candidate
EvoH function applied to it. This creates a sequence of integers in the range 1 to
L. As described previously L is the number of sections the curve is split into, and in
this study fixed to the value 32. This range is maintained by applying a mod L + 1
operation to every point after it has been computed in EvoH. This is necessary to
ensure that only a valid section number is selected by the hash function. Each value
in this sequence is then multiplied by φ and summed across all test points resulting
in the value Test Point Score (TPS) found in Equation 4.1. This value, TPS, is
then divided by the number of test points used and a penalty is applied, as shown in
Equation 4.2.
A penalty is applied to the score if a candidate function does not supply enough
distinct values when used against the complete collection of test points. This thresh-
old was set to 53% of L and was determined via empirical testing. This penalty
discourages candidate functions that return all the same value thereby trivially cre-
ating a better fitness.
4.3 A Complete Run
Having now developed the requisite components of the genetic programming con-
struction, a picture of a complete run can be presented. Each run in this study is
comprised of two components: a genetic programming evolution to find a candidate
hash function, and a run of the Rho algorithm to solve the ECDLP using this evolved
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hash function. This experimental run is compared against a control run of the Rho
algorithm using the original formulation of the iterating function, using the same
initial seed value as the evolved process. A comparison of the number of iterations of
the original formulation is compared against the number of iterations performed by
the evolved hash function.
Chapter 5
Results and Discussion
The most direct way to assess the benefit of the evolved hash function over the original
hash function is to compare the number of iterations it takes to solve for the same
ECDLP for the same curves. The following is an analysis and presentation of the
data collected by this study.
5.1 Curves Examined and Multiple Runs
The dataset is comprised of 40 different curves of varying field sizes, chiefly arranged
by the number of digits in the field size. This field size ranges from 5 to 8 digits.
The actual fields that the curves are based on can be found, ordered from smallest
to largest, in Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. The rough equivalents for bits needed for
the binary representation of the field are summarized in Table 5.5.
Curve Field
1 15349
2 17027
3 18917
4 19913
5 20731
6 29009
7 31319
8 37117
9 42937
10 59743
Table 5.1: Fields Examined 5 Digits in Length
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Curve Field
1 117811
2 128813
3 167593
4 175687
5 303679
6 389527
7 406807
8 521393
9 783533
10 965267
Table 5.2: Fields Examined 6 Digits in Length
Curve Field
1 1009807
2 1142569
3 1196999
4 1288657
5 2297411
6 3370739
7 5569079
8 5689007
9 8764919
10 9032839
Table 5.3: Fields Examined 7 Digits in Length
Curve Field
1 10184123
2 16077749
3 18224243
4 29151791
5 34641751
6 39667153
7 47102819
8 47871209
9 55921661
10 90050687
Table 5.4: Fields Examined 8 Digits in Length
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Number of Digits in Field Binary Representation Equivalent
5 approximately up to 16 bits
6 approximately 17–20 bits
7 approximately 20–24 bits
8 approximately 24–27 bits
Table 5.5: Field Size of Examined Curves expressed in bits
Figure 5.1: Number of Iterations Required for the 10 Curves with 5 Digits
5.2 Comparison of Original Rho Algorithm against
Evolved Counterpart
The results of these comparison between the original Rho Algorithm and the evolved
Rho Algorithm are presented in Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 respectively. For the ten
curves presented in each graph the mean score of the original Rho algorithm based on
30 runs is charted, along with the mean score of 30 runs of the evolved Rho algorithm
using the same seed. The curves are arranged from smallest to largest. A confidence
interval of 95% is also indicated.
The Rho algorithm using the evolved function clearly results in a lower number
of iterations needed to find the solution to the ECDLP versus the original Rho Al-
gorithm. This is observed in all of the 40 the curves examined. The evolved process
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Figure 5.2: Number of Iterations Required for the 10 Curves with 6 Digits
Figure 5.3: Number of Iterations Required for the 10 Curves with 7 Digits
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Figure 5.4: Number of Iterations Required for the 10 Curves with 8 Digits
consistently turns in significantly fewer overall iterations of the Rho algorithm to find
k although in some cases the confidence interval is larger than for the original process.
Of all 40 curves the one that performed the best with an evolved iterating function
was based on F406807. In this case the reduction in required number of iterations was
48% when compared to the number of iterations required by the original formulation.
This is seen in the large dip in the curve labelled 7 in Figure 5.2. What is interesting
to note, however, is that the range of the confidence interval at 95% certainty of
the original Rho algorithm is smaller than for the evolved Rho algorithm, which is a
difference of 8%. This is an interesting trend that manifests in many other curves as
well. It would appear that the evolved Rho produces a bulk reduction in iterations
but within a large range of values. The numeric scores tabulated for this particular
curve, a plot of the fitness change during evolution, and the evolved expression trees
from this curve are presented as Appendices A, B, and C.
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5.3 Comparison of Evolved Iterating Function Against
r + q Mixed Walks
As previously mentioned, this study is applying a novel application of genetic pro-
gramming to the Pollard Rho Algorithm. This uniqueness has resulted in observa-
tions that are difficult to compare against previously published research. The closest
comparator in the literature is provided by Teske [36] who investigated the iterating
function of the Rho algorithm and attempted to replace it with what was termed
an r + q mixed walk. In short the r parameter represents the quantity of adding
operations and the q parameter represents the quantity of doubling operations in the
iterating function. The addition operation can be thought of as equivalent to the L
parameter of the current study, or the amount of subdivisions into which the curve is
separated. The doubling operation is akin to the point doubling operation previously
described in Chapter 2. With an r + q mixed walk the iterating function would
choose a section r and then apply the doubling operator q times to arrive at the
selected point. Empirical testing determined that r = 16 and q = 2 provided the
best improvement over the original Pollard iterating function.
Teske’s work did not count iterations performed by the Pollard Rho Algorithm to
compare different iterating function methodologies against one another but assigned
an L-score to each methodology. This was calculated by averaging out a large number
of ECDLP solutions found using different iterating function methodologies. The
calculation of the L-score is presented in Equation 5.1. The value n is the number
of elliptic curve points found in the field of the ECDLP and is the same n presented
in Algorithm 1 found in Chapter 2. A lower L-score indicates finding the solution to
the underlying ECDLP in fewer iterations of the Rho algorithm then a methodology
with a higher L-score.
L :=
number of iterations until a match is found√
n
(5.1)
The L-score of the best consistently performing r + q mixed walk is transcribed
directly from [36] in the first row of Table 5.6 with the label Teske. To provide a direct
comparison the average L-score of all curves investigated with EvoH from Table 5.1
have been calculated and presented with the label EvoH with 5 digit long fields in
the following row. Additionally the L-scores of all the curves from Table 5.2 using
EvoH are averaged together and are presented in the row labeled EvoH with 6 digit
long fields. This is repeated in the last two rows with the curves from Tables 5.3 and
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Methodology L-Score
Teske 1.427
EvoH with 5 digit long fields 1.063
EvoH with 6 digit long fields 1.100
EvoH with 7 digit long fields 1.156
EvoH with 8 digit long fields 1.204
Table 5.6: L-Scores of Different Partition Functions
5.4 with appropriately defined labels.
Teske conducted experiments on curves in the range of [107, 108]. The curves with
fields 8 digits in length, those found in Table 5.4, provide the closest comparison
to this range. We see that when comparing the two methodologies using curves of
similar size EvoH performs better (1.204 versus 1.427). This difference means that
EvoH takes approximately 16% fewer iterations. Another trend that is demonstrated
in Table 5.6 however, is that as the amount of numbers in the field size increases the
L-Score increases as well. When moving from 5 digits to 6 digits the L-score increases
approximately 4%. From 6 to 7 digits in length there is an approximate 5% increase.
Finally with 7 to 8 digits in length this increase is approximately 4%. This trend
would seem to demonstrate that EvoH might eventually no longer outperform r + q
mixed walks at a much larger field size.
5.4 Comparison of Evolved Iterating Function against
Artificial Neural Network
Similarly, as previously mentioned in Chapter 3 an attempt to use computational
techniques to find the solution to the ECDLP was presented in [19]. In this study an
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) was trained to find the least significant digit in an
ECDLP. Knowing this value drastically reduces the amount of computation required
to find the full solution to the problem. A summary of results found is presented
in Table 5.7. Here best accuracy refers to amount of curves the methodology was
able to find the solution for in each curves size, based on bit length. A control group
used in the study that simply used a random search to find the solution obtained an
accuracy of 65%. Once averaged across all instances of bit size and ANN used by the
study a total accuracy of 57% was calculated. Clearly since this method fails to find
the correct solution in all cases, something which EvoH is guaranteed to do, it is not
a reliable method to solve the ECDLP.
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Bit Size of Curve Best Accuracy
14 61.11%
20 59.52%
32 63.16%
Table 5.7: ANN Laskari et al accuracy with different curve sizes
Methodology Bit Size of Curves
EvoH 5 digits long up to 16
EvoH 6 digits long 17 – 20
EvoH 7 digits long 20 – 24
EvoH 8 digits long 24 – 27
r + q Teske 24 – 29
Laskari et al 14, 20, 32
Table 5.8: Field Size of Examined Curves Expressed in Bits
5.5 Runtime of Experiments
A single experiment for a curve of field size 5 digits (or up to approximately 16 bits)
involving a complete evolution of 100 generations and a corresponding Rho algorithm
generally completed within a few minutes running on a mid-power i5 desktop com-
puter. Curves of field size 6 digits (or approximately 17–20 bits) required a few hours
to complete. Curves of field size 7 digits (or approximately 20–24 bits) required days
of runtime for a single experiment to complete. Finally, curves of field size 8 digits (or
approximately 24–27 bits) completed in about double the amount of time required
for those of 7 digits. A comparison of the bit sizes of all three of the methodologies
examined is presented in Table 5.8.
These values can also be compared to the Certicom challenge curves [3]. First
presented in 2004 the Certicom company introduced a series of ECDLP problems
and offered a bounty to researchers who could solve them. This ostensibly was to
increase awareness and adoption of elliptic curve cryptosystems. An introductory
exercise presented in the white paper proposed that while utilizing a cluster of 3000
computers an expected runtime for a 79 bit curve would be a few hours, an expected
runtime of a few days for an 89 bit curve, and an expected runtime of a few weeks for
a 97 bit curve. Researchers have found solutions to all three of these exercise curves
and to date only one solution for the Level 1 curves proposed by Certicom has been
found. This involved solving a 109 bit curve using a cluster of 2600 computers that
ran for 17 months. The method used to find the solution was a modified version of
the parallel Rho algorithm.
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5.6 Observable Results
An important fact worth noting is that the solution to the ECDLP being investigated
was found 100% of the time. This perfect success rate was achieved across all 40
curves for each of the 30 runs performed. Considering all 40 curves and all 30 runs,
the evolved Rho algorithm required approximately 71% of the number of iterations
compared to the original Rho algorithm. Compare these results to those from [19]
which investigated curves of similar size (14, 20 and 32 bits), yet only managed to
find the correct solution on average 57% of the time.
The curves investigated in this experiment are not of the same calibre as those
found in industrial applications. The fields that were chosen for this study were
used to determine if an evolved iterating hash function decreased runtime of the Rho
algorithm. At the current time, choosing larger curves would not allow an adequate
number of runs to be completed for each experiment in a reasonable time. With
this understanding, however, this initial study provides significant hope that with
further study computational intelligence techniques will prove to be a viable option
for cryptanalysis of ciphers based on elliptic curves.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
This study presents an initial analysis of how to improve Pollard’s Rho Algorithm
using computational intelligence techniques. It is shown that replacing the default
iterating function with an evolved genetic programming expression reliably causes a
reduction in the number of iterations needed to find the solution to the ECDLP.
6.1 Contributions
Observed results indicate that there is a strong correspondence between an evolved,
randomly distributed, iterating hash function and a reduction in the number of iter-
ations performed by the Rho algorithm. In this case, “randomly distributed” means
that the iterating function is evolved to distribute a collection of randomly chosen
test points from the elliptic curve in question through out all of the sections into
which the curve is subdivided as the Rho algorithm progresses. This is the param-
eter known as L in Algorithm 1 first presented in Chapter 2. These results were
obtained by using a common application of genetic programming parameters. The
unique characteristic of this study is the fitness function applied to the problem. This
fitness function attempted to favour candidate functions that increased the random-
ness of the distribution of these test points and to penalize candidate functions that
provided the same value through a constant as opposed to an expression. It also
penalized candidate functions that could not produce enough unique values when all
test points were considered. As described in Chapter 4 if the values produced by the
evolved iterating hash function did not at least produce a rate of 53% unique values
in the sequence it prematurely converged to a trivially good fitness score and cease
evolving in a meaningful way.
It is promising to note that this conclusion was borne out across all runs, and
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across all curves. That is to say in 100% of all test cases investigated, the evolved
expression tree yielded a lower average number of iterations compared to the original
formulation of the process proposed by Pollard in [27]. This included the progression
from small field sizes to larger field sizes. This observed reduction was not insignificant
and points to promising future studies that could exploit this phenomenon for an even
greater reduction in Rho algorithm runtime by a further analysis of the application
of a genetic programming technique to the iterating function.
6.2 Future Work
6.2.1 Constructing the attack in other ways
This evolutionary process could easily be extended to the Parallel Pollard Rho without
much need for adaptation. As seen in Algorithm 2 in Chapter 3, a form of iterating
function is needed by each client component. There is no reason why this could
not be substituted with an evolved iteration function as outlined in the methodology
presented in this study. What might also provide interesting results is to re-envision
the application of the evolutionary process in the parallel formulation. For example,
with a sufficiently sophisticated genetic algorithm it might be possible to evolve a
better definition of “distinguished point”. Further it might be possible to combine
these two criteria in a mult-objective fitness function that attempts to investigate if
the application of both of these factors results in an even further reduction in runtime.
As it stands now the presented process only investigated whether an evolved hash
function performs better then the original formulation of the iterating function. If
the initial purpose of investigation is to simply find the solution to the ECDLP many
short-cuts and different configurations of the process could be investigated. For exam-
ple there has been some analysis (e.g. [37] and [9]) that has calculated the expected
number of iterations that one can expect when running the Pollard Rho algorithm
against a particular curve. If one were to cross this threshold with a particular ex-
pression tree, then it might be beneficial to stop the process, add the used expression
tree to a black list, and re-evolve a new unique expression tree and start again. If the
fitness score is carefully observed and recorded this additional evolutionary process
might by conducted in such a way that it continues to be evolved until it passes the
fitness score of the initial expression tree. It might also be possible to evolve successive
well distributed hash functions in attempt to determine if a common characteristic is
seen in all of them, thereby providing some insight into the structure of the chosen
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curve, or in fact the dynamics of iterating through members of a group.
6.2.2 Refinements to the Genetic Programming Construc-
tion
This study applied a very common configuration of the genetic programming process
to a novel domain. There might be some value in investigating this construction to
see if it is possible to change some of these default configurations. For example the
set of terminal and internal nodes might be modified to be more specific to elliptic
curve algebra. The addition of a point doubling operator to the internal node set for
instance might allow the evolved hash function to perform even better then the set of
basic mathematical operators. The inclusion of a point multiplication operator with
an integer constant might work even better than simply a point doubling operator.
This study also did not look at varying the L parameter, and so it might be feasible
to include this value as part of the evolutionary construction. For example, a multi-
objective construction could be envisioned that attempts to find not only a random
distribution of points but also an effective number of sections into which the points
are to be distributed. It might also be worth investigating the best maximum tree
size of the expression trees for different curves. For smaller curves, it is possible that
decreasing the maximum tree size will improve results by better controlling bloat.
Meanwhile, increasing the maximum tree size may allow the process to scale to larger
curve sizes.
Another avenue of research that might prove useful is to study the application of
a different fitness function. The prevailing sentiment relies on the assumption that a
highly distributed iterating function will operate more randomly, thus requiring fewer
iterations. A fitness function could be proposed that calculates this randomness in
different methods than the one investigated here. For example by creating a weighted
sum of a mean and median calculation. Or it might be possible to devise a fitness
function that is based on the entropy created by the evolved iteration function. Lastly
a topic of further investigation might be the selection process of the test points. Here a
random sample of points was collected and a fixed number was enforced across a large
set of possibilities. It might be beneficial to sample these points more consistently
across the contours of the curve. Additionally it might be possible to arrive at a
better number of test points to utilize based on the number of points in the curve.
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Appendix A
Best Evolved Rho Iterations
The data presented here is the Rho algorithm iteration counts used to solve the
ECDLP problem over F406807 using the original formulation and the evolved for-
mulation. This curve showed the highest reduction of iterations between the two
formulations of all the curves investigated in the course of this study.
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Run Original Rho Iterations Evolved Iterations
1 765 674
2 792 901
3 809 641
4 820 395
5 840 252
6 928 840
7 960 741
8 960 611
9 984 572
10 1030 92
11 1041 132
12 1048 928
13 1074 791
14 1077 366
15 1092 404
16 1130 402
17 1222 371
18 1424 669
19 1516 346
20 1564 219
21 1675 880
22 1892 931
23 2272 40
24 785 585
25 872 169
26 935 747
27 1044 392
28 1119 466
29 1305 696
30 2073 319
Table A.1: Run details for best found evolved solution for F406807
Appendix B
Fitness Plot of Most Improved
Rho Score
This is the fitness plot of the evolution that produced the greatest reduction in number
of iterations for the Pollard Rho Algorithm in the curves investigated in this study.
This shows values averaged over 30 courses of evolution for the curve defined over
F406807.
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Figure B.1: Fitness plot of F406807
Appendix C
Best Performing Evolved Hash
Functions
The following is the complete set of expression trees that were evolved for F406807.
Run 1
operator.neg(operator.neg(P.y))
Run 2
operator.sub(operator.add(P.y, P.y), operator.neg(P.y)
Run 3
operator.add(operator.add(operator.mul(operator.neg(P.y),
operator.mul(P.y, operator.neg(P.y))),
operator.mul(P.y, operator.mul(
operator.mul(operator.neg(P.y),
operator.mul(P.y, operator.mul(operator.neg(P.y),
operator.mul(operator.mul(P.y, operator.mul(P.y, P.y)),
operator.add(operator.add(operator.neg(P.y), P.y),
operator.neg(P.y)))))),
operator.add(operator.add(operator.neg(P.y), P.y), P.y)))),
operator.add(P.y, operator.add(operator.add(P.y, P.y),
operator.sub(P.y, operator.mul(operator.neg(P.y),
operator.mul(P.y, P.y))))))
Run 4
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operator.neg(operator.sub(
operator.mul(operator.mul(
operator.add(operator.mul(operator.add(
operator.add(P.y, P.y), P.y),
operator.sub(operator.mul(operator.add(P.y, P.y),
operator.add(P.y, P.y)), P.y)), P.y),
operator.sub(operator.mul(operator.add(P.y, P.y), P.y), P.y)),
operator.add(P.y, P.y)),
operator.sub(operator.mul(operator.add(P.y,
operator.mul(P.y, P.y)), P.y), P.y)))
Run 5
operator.sub(operator.sub(operator.sub(P.y,
operator.mul(operator.sub(operator.neg(
operator.mul(operator.mul(operator.sub(P.y,
operator.mul(operator.sub(P.y,
operator.mul(operator.sub(P.y, P.y),
operator.add(P.y, P.y))),
operator.add(P.y, P.y))), P.y),
operator.add(P.y, P.y))), P.y),
operator.add(P.y, operator.sub(P.y,
operator.mul(operator.sub(P.y, P.y), P.y))))), P.y),
operator.neg(operator.sub(P.y,
operator.mul(operator.mul(operator.mul(
operator.sub(P.y, operator.mul(P.y,
operator.add(P.y, operator.add(P.y, P.y)))),
operator.add(P.y, operator.mul(P.y, P.y))),
operator.add(P.y, P.y)), operator.add(P.y, operator.add(P.y, P.y))))))
Run 6
operator.sub(operator.sub(operator.sub(
operator.sub(operator.mul(operator.sub(
operator.sub(operator.add(operator.neg(
operator.sub(operator.neg(P.y),
operator.add(P.y, P.y))), P.y), P.y), P.y),
operator.mul(operator.sub(operator.sub(
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operator.sub(P.y, P.y), P.y), P.y),
operator.sub(P.y, operator.add(operator.sub(
operator.sub(P.y, P.y), P.y), operator.mul(P.y,
operator.sub(P.y, operator.add(operator.sub(P.y, P.y),
operator.mul(P.y, P.y)))))))), P.y), operator.add(P.y, P.y)), P.y), P.y)
Run 7
operator.sub(P.y, operator.neg(operator.mul(
operator.add(operator.neg(operator.mul(P.y, P.y)), P.y),
operator.add(P.y, operator.add(P.y, operator.add(
operator.mul(operator.sub(P.y, operator.mul(
operator.mul(P.y, P.y), P.y)), operator.mul(
operator.sub(operator.neg(P.y), operator.add(P.y, P.y)),
operator.add(operator.neg(operator.mul(P.y, P.y)), P.y))), P.y))))))
Run 8
operator.sub(operator.neg(operator.neg(P.y)),
operator.mul(operator.sub(operator.mul(P.y, P.y),
operator.sub(operator.mul(operator.sub(
operator.mul(P.y, P.y), P.y),
operator.neg(operator.neg(P.y))), P.y)),
operator.mul(operator.sub(operator.mul(P.y, P.y), P.y),
operator.neg(operator.sub(operator.mul(P.y, P.y), P.y)))))
Run 9
operator.add(operator.mul(operator.mul(P.y, P.y),
operator.add(P.y, operator.add(operator.mul(
operator.mul(operator.add(operator.mul(P.y,
operator.sub(operator.add(operator.mul(operator.mul(P.y,
operator.mul(P.y, operator.mul(operator.sub(P.y, P.y),
operator.neg(P.y)))), operator.mul(P.y, P.y)),
operator.add(operator.mul(operator.mul(operator.mul(P.y, P.y),
operator.sub(operator.add(P.y, P.y), operator.sub(P.y, P.y))),
operator.add(P.y, P.y)), P.y)), operator.add(P.y, P.y))),
operator.add(operator.mul(operator.mul(P.y, P.y), P.y), P.y)),
operator.mul(P.y, operator.add(operator.add(
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operator.sub(operator.sub(P.y, operator.neg(
operator.mul(P.y, P.y))), P.y), P.y), P.y))),
operator.mul(operator.mul(P.y, P.y),
operator.add(P.y, operator.mul(operator.mul(operator.mul(
operator.mul(P.y, P.y), P.y), operator.add(
operator.mul(P.y, operator.mul(P.y, P.y)),
operator.add(P.y, P.y))), P.y)))),
operator.add(operator.mul(P.y,
operator.add(P.y, P.y)), P.y)))), P.y)),
operator.sub(P.y, operator.neg(operator.mul(P.y, P.y))))
Run 10
operator.sub(operator.mul(operator.sub(operator.add(
P.y, operator.sub(P.y, operator.neg(P.y))), P.y),
operator.mul(operator.sub(P.y, operator.neg(
operator.mul(operator.sub(P.y, operator.sub(
operator.mul(operator.sub(P.y, P.y),
operator.sub(P.y, P.y)), P.y)), operator.add(P.y,
operator.add(operator.neg(operator.mul(P.y,
operator.sub(P.y, P.y))), P.y))))),
operator.add(operator.add(P.y, P.y), P.y))),
operator.add(operator.add(P.y, P.y), P.y))
Run 11
operator.add(operator.mul(operator.add(operator.mul(
operator.mul(operator.add(P.y, P.y),
operator.add(P.y, P.y)), operator.mul(P.y, P.y)), P.y),
operator.add(P.y, operator.add(operator.mul(
operator.neg(operator.mul(P.y, operator.neg(P.y))),
operator.mul(operator.mul(operator.add(operator.mul(
operator.neg(operator.neg(operator.neg(P.y))), P.y), P.y),
operator.add(P.y, P.y)), operator.mul(P.y, P.y))), P.y))), P.y)
Run 12
operator.add(operator.mul(operator.mul(operator.neg(P.y),
operator.mul(P.y, operator.add(P.y, operator.mul(
APPENDIX C. BEST PERFORMING EVOLVED HASH FUNCTIONS 59
operator.add(P.y, P.y), operator.mul(operator.add(P.y, P.y),
operator.neg(operator.add(P.y, P.y))))))),
operator.mul(operator.neg(operator.mul(
operator.neg(P.y), operator.mul(P.y,
operator.mul(operator.mul(operator.neg(P.y),
operator.mul(P.y, operator.add(P.y, operator.mul(
operator.add(P.y, P.y), operator.mul(operator.add(
operator.add(P.y, operator.mul(operator.add(P.y,
operator.neg(P.y)), operator.mul(P.y, P.y))), P.y),
operator.neg(operator.add(P.y, P.y))))))),
operator.mul(operator.neg(operator.mul(operator.neg(P.y),
operator.mul(P.y, operator.add(P.y,
operator.add(P.y, P.y))))), P.y))))), P.y)), operator.add(P.y, P.y))
Run 13
operator.sub(P.y, operator.mul(operator.mul(operator.add(
operator.mul(operator.mul(operator.mul(operator.add(
operator.mul(operator.mul(P.y, P.y), P.y), P.y),
operator.add(operator.add(P.y, operator.mul(
operator.mul(P.y, P.y), P.y)),
operator.neg(P.y))), P.y), P.y), operator.neg(P.y)),
operator.add(operator.mul(operator.mul(P.y,
operator.add(operator.mul(operator.neg(P.y), P.y),
operator.neg(P.y))), operator.add(P.y, P.y)),
operator.neg(P.y))), operator.add(P.y, P.y)))
Run 14
operator.neg(operator.add(operator.add(operator.mul(P.y,
operator.add(operator.mul(operator.add(P.y,
operator.add(P.y, P.y)), P.y),
operator.mul(operator.add(P.y, P.y),
operator.add(P.y, P.y)))), P.y), P.y))
Run 15
operator.sub(operator.add(operator.mul(P.y, P.y),
operator.mul(operator.sub(operator.add(P.y, P.y),
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operator.mul(P.y, operator.sub(operator.neg(P.y),
operator.add(P.y, P.y)))), P.y)), P.y)
Run 16
operator.sub(operator.add(P.y, operator.add(
operator.mul(operator.add(P.y, operator.add(
operator.mul(operator.add(operator.add(
operator.add(operator.mul(operator.add(P.y,
operator.sub(P.y, P.y)), P.y), P.y),
operator.neg(P.y)), operator.mul(
operator.add(P.y, P.y), P.y)), operator.sub(P.y,
operator.add(operator.add(operator.mul(
operator.add(P.y, operator.sub(P.y, P.y)), P.y), P.y),
operator.neg(P.y)))), P.y)), operator.sub(
operator.add(operator.mul(operator.add(P.y, P.y),
operator.sub(P.y, operator.add(operator.add(
operator.mul(operator.add(P.y, P.y), P.y), P.y), P.y))), P.y), P.y)), P.y)),
operator.neg(P.y))
Run 17
operator.add(operator.add(operator.add(P.y, P.y),
operator.sub(operator.add(P.y, P.y), P.y)),
operator.mul(operator.mul(operator.add(P.y, P.y),
operator.add(operator.add(operator.add(
operator.add(operator.mul(operator.add(P.y, P.y),
operator.add(operator.add(operator.add(P.y, P.y),
operator.add(P.y, P.y)), P.y)), operator.mul(P.y, P.y)), P.y),
operator.add(P.y, P.y)), P.y)), operator.sub(P.y, operator.neg(P.y))))
Run 18
operator.add(operator.neg(operator.neg(operator.mul(
operator.neg(P.y), operator.mul(P.y, P.y)))),
operator.add(operator.neg(operator.mul(P.y, P.y)),
operator.mul(operator.neg(P.y), operator.mul(P.y,
operator.neg(operator.mul(operator.neg(P.y),
operator.neg(operator.neg(operator.neg(operator.mul(
operator.neg(P.y), operator.mul(P.y, P.y)))))))))))
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Run 19
operator.add(P.y, operator.sub(operator.add(operator.mul(
operator.add(operator.mul(operator.mul(operator.add(
operator.mul(P.y, operator.mul(operator.mul(P.y,
operator.add(P.y, P.y)), operator.add(
operator.add(P.y, P.y), P.y))), P.y), operator.mul(
operator.mul(P.y, P.y), P.y)), operator.mul(P.y,
operator.add(P.y, P.y))), operator.mul(operator.mul(P.y,
operator.add(operator.mul(operator.neg(operator.neg(P.y)),
operator.add(P.y, P.y)), operator.neg(P.y))),
operator.add(operator.mul(P.y, operator.add(P.y, P.y)), P.y))),
operator.mul(P.y, P.y)), operator.add(operator.mul(
operator.sub(operator.add(P.y, operator.mul(operator.neg(P.y),
operator.add(P.y, P.y))), P.y), operator.sub(P.y, P.y)), P.y)),
operator.sub(P.y, P.y)))
Run 20
operator.neg(P.y)
Run 21
operator.sub(operator.neg(operator.add(operator.add(P.y, P.y), P.y)),
operator.mul(operator.add(operator.add(P.y, P.y), P.y),
operator.add(P.y, operator.add(operator.mul(
operator.add(P.y, P.y), operator.add(operator.mul(
operator.add(operator.mul(
operator.add(P.y, P.y), P.y), P.y), P.y), P.y)), P.y))))
Run 22
operator.add(operator.add(P.y, P.y), P.y)
Run 23
operator.add(operator.sub(P.y, operator.sub(P.y, operator.mul(
operator.sub(operator.sub(P.y, operator.mul(
operator.sub(P.y, operator.sub(operator.add(P.y,
operator.mul(P.y, P.y)), P.y)), operator.sub(P.y,
operator.sub(P.y, operator.mul(operator.sub(
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operator.sub(P.y, operator.mul(P.y, operator.mul(
operator.sub(operator.add(P.y, P.y),
operator.mul(P.y, P.y)), P.y))), operator.sub(P.y,
operator.mul(operator.sub(P.y, operator.sub(
operator.add(P.y, P.y), operator.mul(P.y, P.y))), P.y))), P.y))))),
operator.sub(operator.add(operator.sub(P.y, operator.mul(
operator.sub(P.y, P.y), operator.sub(P.y, P.y))), P.y),
operator.mul(P.y, P.y))), P.y))), P.y)
Run 24
operator.sub(operator.neg(P.y), operator.add(operator.mul(
operator.sub(operator.sub(operator.mul(
operator.neg(P.y), operator.mul(P.y, operator.mul(
operator.neg(P.y), operator.mul(P.y, P.y)))), P.y),
operator.mul(operator.mul(operator.neg(operator.neg(
operator.neg(P.y))), operator.mul(P.y, P.y)),
operator.mul(operator.sub(operator.sub(operator.neg(P.y), P.y),
operator.mul(operator.mul(operator.neg(P.y),
operator.mul(P.y, P.y)), P.y)), P.y))), P.y), P.y))
Run 25
operator.add(P.y, operator.add(operator.add(P.y,
operator.add(operator.add(operator.add(P.y, P.y),
operator.add(P.y, operator.add(P.y, P.y))),
operator.add(P.y, operator.add(operator.sub(P.y, P.y),
operator.neg(operator.neg(P.y)))))), operator.mul(operator.add(operator.add(
operator.add(operator.mul(operator.sub(P.y,
operator.add(P.y, P.y)), operator.neg(operator.mul(
operator.add(operator.add(P.y, P.y), P.y), operator.sub(
operator.neg(operator.neg(P.y)), operator.mul(
operator.sub(P.y, operator.add(P.y, P.y)),
operator.neg(operator.mul(operator.add(
operator.add(P.y, P.y), P.y), operator.sub(
operator.neg(operator.neg(P.y)), operator.neg(
operator.add(P.y, P.y)))))))))), P.y), P.y), P.y),
operator.sub(P.y, operator.add(P.y, operator.add(P.y,
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operator.add(operator.add(operator.add(P.y, P.y),
operator.add(P.y, P.y)), P.y)))))))
Run 26
operator.neg(P.y)
Run 27
operator.neg(P.y)
Run 28
operator.neg(operator.sub(operator.sub(P.y, operator.add(
operator.add(operator.add(P.y, operator.mul(operator.add(
operator.mul(operator.add(P.y, operator.sub(P.y,
operator.add(P.y, P.y))), operator.add(P.y, P.y)), P.y),
operator.mul(P.y, P.y))), P.y), operator.mul(
operator.add(P.y, operator.sub(P.y, operator.add(P.y,
operator.mul(operator.add(P.y, P.y), operator.add(P.y, P.y))))),
operator.add(P.y, P.y)))), operator.add(P.y,
operator.mul(operator.add(operator.add(P.y,
operator.mul(operator.add(operator.mul(operator.add(P.y,
operator.sub(P.y, operator.add(P.y, P.y))), operator.add(P.y,
operator.add(operator.add(operator.sub(P.y, P.y), operator.neg(
operator.add(P.y, operator.mul(operator.add(P.y, P.y),
operator.add(operator.add(P.y, P.y),
operator.add(P.y, P.y)))))), P.y))), P.y),
operator.mul(P.y, P.y))), P.y), operator.add(P.y, P.y)))))
Run 29
operator.sub(operator.neg(operator.mul(operator.sub(
operator.mul(P.y, operator.add(P.y, P.y)), P.y),
operator.add(operator.mul(P.y, P.y), operator.add(P.y, P.y)))),
operator.mul(operator.sub(operator.mul(P.y, operator.mul(P.y, P.y)), P.y), P.y))
Run 30
operator.add(operator.mul(operator.neg(operator.mul(
operator.neg(operator.add(P.y, operator.mul(
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operator.neg(P.y), operator.add(operator.mul(
operator.neg(operator.neg(operator.add(P.y,
operator.mul(P.y, P.y)))), operator.add(P.y,
operator.mul(operator.mul(operator.neg(operator.mul(
operator.mul(P.y, operator.neg(operator.mul(P.y, P.y))), P.y)),
operator.add(P.y, operator.add(operator.neg(P.y),
operator.add(P.y, P.y)))), operator.sub(operator.neg(P.y),
operator.neg(operator.mul(P.y, operator.neg(P.y))))))),
operator.mul(operator.mul(P.y, P.y), operator.add(P.y, P.y)))))),
operator.add(P.y, P.y))), operator.add(P.y,
operator.mul(operator.neg(P.y), operator.mul(operator.neg(P.y),
operator.add(P.y, operator.add(P.y, operator.mul(P.y,
operator.add(P.y, P.y)))))))), operator.mul(P.y,
operator.add(operator.neg(P.y), operator.mul(operator.neg(
operator.add(operator.mul(P.y, P.y), operator.add(P.y,
operator.mul(operator.mul(operator.neg(operator.mul(P.y,
operator.sub(P.y, P.y))), operator.add(operator.mul(
operator.mul(operator.neg(operator.add(P.y, P.y)), P.y),
operator.add(operator.neg(P.y), operator.mul(
operator.neg(P.y), P.y))), operator.mul(P.y,
operator.add(P.y, P.y)))), operator.sub(operator.neg(
operator.neg(P.y)), operator.sub(P.y, P.y)))))), P.y))))
